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Documentos de Discusión
07-01. Kaplan, D.,
E. Piedra, and E. Seira. "Are
Burdensome Registration Procedures an Important Barrier
on Firm Creation? Evidence from Mexico"
Abstract: There has been increasing concern
that the difficulty of obtaining firm operation licences
in developing countries may decrease firm creation and
increase informality. We estimate the effect on new firm
creation/registration of a program that speeds up firm
registration procedures and makes them more transparent.
The program was implemented in Mexico in different municipalities
at different dates. Our preferred estimates suggest that
new firm registration increased by around 4% in eligible
industries. Most of the effect is temporary, being concentrated
on the first 10 months after the program is implemented.
This suggests that the programs effect may operate
through registering existing firms instead of spurring
creation of new ones. We compare this magnitude to some
benchmarks to assess its size.
N. "The Trader, the
Market Maker, his Guru and her Information"
Abstract: This paper argues that a guru possessing
a multi-dimensional informational advantage may want to
truthfully report her opinion to the media to learn more
out of the actions of other, sometimes better-informed
Opinion Polls and Social Learning"
Abstract: This paper analyzes cheap
talk in an investment model with information
externalities. In contrast to Gossner and
Melissas (2006), I allow for (i) competition
effects, (ii) positive network externalities
and (iii) more than one interviewed player.
In the presence of competition effects, a
player will never truthfully reveal her information
about the realized state of the world. In
the presence of positive network externalities,
however, there exists a parameter range where,
under mild additional conditions, the unique
equilibrium is the separating one. Finally,
using numerical computations, I show that
for a sufficiently large number of interviewed
players there exists a separating equilibrium
in my entire parameter range.
G., and S. Rendón. "Employment
and Deadweight Loss Effects of Observed Non-Wage
Abstract: To assess the employment
effects of labor costs it is crucial to have
reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity
of labor demand. Using a matched firm-worker
dataset, we estimate a long run unconditional
labor demand function, exploiting information
on workers to correct for endogeneity in the
determination of wages. We evaluate the employment
and deadweight loss effects of observed employers'
contributions imposed by labor laws (health
insurance, training, and taxes) as well as
of observed workers' deductions (social security,
and income tax). We find that non-wage labor
costs reduce employment by 17% for white-collars
and by 53% for blue-collars, with associated
deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total
contributions, respectively. Since most firms
undercomply with mandated employers' and workers
contributions, we find that full compliance
would imply employment losses of 4% for white-collars
and 12% for blue-collars, with respective
associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%.
D. "Lower bounds
and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating
Abstract: For the problem of adjudicating conflicting
claims, we study lower bounds on the awards of each agent.
We propose extending a lower bound by performing the following
operation: (i) for each problem, assign the lower bound
and revise the problem accordingly; (ii) assign the bound
of the revised problem. The "recursive-extension"
of a bound is the lower bound obtained by recursive application
of this operation. We provide necessary and sufficient
conditions on a lower bound for there to be a unique rule
satisfying its recursive-extension. We show that, under
these conditions, the rule satisfying the recursive-extension
of a bound is the unique rule satisfying the following
property: the awards assigned by a rule should be obtainable
in two ways: (i) directly applying the rule to the problem
or (ii) first assigning the bound and revising the problem
accordingly, and then applying the rule to the revised
problem. Then, we study whether this procedure leads to
well-behaved lower bounds.
L. "The Effect of
an Old-Age Demogrant on the Labor Supply and Time Use
of the Elderly and Non-Elderly in Mexico"
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect
of a generous demogrant for the elderly that started in
2001 in Mexico City on the labor supply and time use of
the elderly and of non-elderly family members who live
with them. Using data for the period 2000-2004 and a triple
differences approach, I find that prime-age women reduce
both their housework and market work time significantly,
but only if they live with an age-qualifying woman in
a poor neighborhood after the program started. In contrast,
the program seems to have no significant effect on the
time use of prime-age men. My results suggest that some
of the public resources devoted to the elderly could actually
spill over to other age groups, especially in countries
where extended families are common, and that the gender
of the potential beneficiary matters for outcomes.
L. "Altruism, Exchange
and Crowding Out of Private Support to the Elderly: Evidence
from a Demogrant in Mexico"
Abstract: This paper uses a recent demogrant
for the elderly in Mexico City to estimate the effect
of an exogenous increase in the income of older individuals
on the amount of private transfers they receive. My results
show that not controlling for the endogeneity of income
replicates the positive or small negative effects of income
on the amount of private transfers received obtained by
previous work. In contrast, my instrumental variables
strategy yields negative and significant income effects,
not far from the minus one implied by altruistic models,
suggesting that a change in the public resources for elderly
could be neutralized by the response of private transfers.
S., and I. Lobato, "Transformations
of the State Variable and Learning Dynamics"
Abstract: This article studies dynamics in
a model where agents forecast a one dimensional state
variable via ordinary least squares regressions on the
lagged values of the state variable. We study the stability
properties of alternative transformations of the state
variable that the agent can endogenously set forth. We
study the consequences on the economy's stability of the
typical transformations that an econometrician would attempt,
such as differencing, detrending, or taking instantaneous
concave transformations, such as logarithms. Surprisingly,
for the considered class of economies, we found that these
transformations are destabilizing, whereas alternative
transformations, which an econometrician would never consider,
such as convex transformations, are stabilizing. Therefore,
we ironically find that in our set-up, an active agent,
who is concerned about learning the economy's dynamics
and transforms the state variable, in an attempt to improve
forecasting, is more likely to deviate from the steady
state than a passive agent.
S., and A. Cuecuecha, "International
Job Search: Mexicans in and out of the U.S."
Abstract: It is argued that migration from
Mexico to the US and return migration are determined by
international wage differentials and preferences for origin.
We use a model of job search, savings and migration to
show that job turnover is a crucial determinant of the
migration process. We estimate this model by Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) and find that migration practically
disappears if Mexico has American arrival rates while
employed. Doubling migration costs reduces migration rates
in half, while subsidizing return migration in $300 reduces
migration rates of older migrants but increases migration
rates of younger migrants.