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| Centro de Investigación
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Documentos de Discusión
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Serie
2008
08-01. Elbittar, A.,
and A. Gomberg. "A
laboratory study of Demand Reduction and Collusion in
Uniform- and Discriminatory-Price Auctions"
Abstract: We report results of an experimental
study of multi-object uniform and discriminatory-price
auctions in an environment of publicly known common values,
concentrating on an environment where theory predicts
sharply different results of the two auction formats.
We find that the bidding behavior in the uniform case
exhibits two clear regularities: agents consistently play
weakly dominated strategies by overbidding on the first
unit and have moderate difficulty coordinating on the
high payoff (low auction revenue) equilibrium predicted
by theory. However, subjects with experience in the same
environment are better at reducing demand to achieve higher
payoff. Bidders in discriminatory auctions, as predicted,
tend to submit bids close to value for all units and are
not generally successful in attempts at collusion.
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08-02. Duggan,
J., and C. Martinelli. "The
Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics"
Abstract: We formalize the concept of media slant as
a relative emphasis on different issues of political interest
by the media, and we illustrate the effects of the media choice
of slant on political outcomes and economic decisions in a rational
expectations model. In a two-candidate election, if the media
is biased in favor of the underdog, then it will put more emphasis
on issues with a large electoral impact, hoping that the news
will deliver an upset victory. Whether citizens are better off
with media biased in favor of the underdog or the frontrunner
depends on the importance of choosing the "right"
candidate for citizens versus the impact of political news on
the private economic decisions of voters. Balanced media, giving
each issue equal coverage, may be worse for voters than partisan
media.
08-03. Domínguez,
D., and A. Nicolo. "Recursive
no-envy "
Abstract: In economics the main efficiency criterion
is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a
social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each
agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to
her own preferences, as any of the other agent's bundle). For
most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these
two properties, which selects a single allocation which is Pareto-optimal
and satisfies no-envy in two-agent exchange economies. There
is no straightforward generalization of our procedure to more
than two-agents.
08-04. Juárez,
L. "Are Informal Workers
Compensated for the Lack of Fringe Benefits? Free Health Care
as an Instrument for Formality"
Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of having a
job covered by social security, on the wages of female salaried
workers. I overcome the heterogeneity bias that typically contaminates
estimates by using the exogenous availability of free health
care and prescription drugs implemented in 2001 in the part
of Mexico City that belongs to Distrito Federal (DF). This program
provides valid instruments because health care is a substantial
component of the benefits provided by social security, so the
availability of alternative free health care should decrease
the incentive to contribute to the system. In addition, eligibility
for this program is not correlated with individual unobserved
characteristics that affect either wages or the choice of sector.
My results show that being a DF resident after free health care
was implemented has a negative an significant effect on the
probability that a female salaried worker has social security
in her current job. Regarding wages, not controlling for the
endogeneity of formality on the wage regression gives rise to
a positive formal premium as in previous studies for both developed
and developing countries. In contrast, my instrumental variables
results show that female salaried workers in the formal sector
earn between 16 to 23 percent less than female workers in informal
jobs. These results show that workers who receive higher fringe
benefits are paid a lower wage, shich supports the compensating
differential theory. In the Mexican context, it would also suggest
that informal salaried workers are not necessarily worse off
than their counterparts in the formal sector.
08-05. Melissas,
N. "Bidding and Drilling
on Offshore Wildcat Tracts"
Abstract: I study a game in which firms first bid on
wildcat tracts and then time their drilling decisions. In an
equilibrium bids are used as a coordination device: if player
i bid low while player -i bid high, player i
waits while player -i drills. This equilibrium is consistent
with the empirical findings of Hendricks and Porter (1996).
Firms know that by bidding "low" they can be allocated
the right to free-ride. This induces "optimistic"
firms to submit "low" bids. Nonetheless, this equilibrium
need not reduce expected revenues as compared to the benchmark
case in which one abstracts from signalling issues.
08-06. Coady,
D., Martinelli, C., and S. Parker. "Information
and Participation in a Social Program"
Abstract: Participation in a social program, like that
in clubs and other social organizations, is the result of a
process in which an agent first learns about the requirements,
benefits, and the likelihood of acceptance, applies for membership,
and finally is accepted or rejected. At each stage of the process,
decisions made by the agent are responsive to expectations about
the decisions and outcomes at the following stages. We propose
a model of the participation process and estimate it using data
from a social program in Mexico. We are able to distinguish
empirically between information costs and other application
costs, and show that self-selection due to information costs
in fact contributes to targeting the program to the poorest
families.
08-07. Meza,
F., and C. Urrutia. "Great
Appreciations: Accounting for the Real Exchange Rate in Mexico"
Abstract: Between 1988 and 2002, the real exchange rate
in Mexico appreciated by 45%. We account for this movement in
relative prices using a two sector, dynamic general equilibrium
model of a small open economy with tradable an non-tradable
goods. The model allows us to identify the effect of the differential
in productivity growth across sectors (the Balassa-Samuelson
effect) from other types of shocks affecting the allocation
of resources (terms of trade, migration remittances and international
reserves accumulation). We find that productivity growth in
the tradable sector and a decline in the real interest rate
faced by Mexico in the international markets account for 70%
of the real exchange rate appreciation. Our model is also consistent
with the reallocation of capital and labor from tradable to
non-tradable sectors. None of our results support a significant
role for terms of trade, migration remittances or international
reserves accumulation.
Comentarios: cie_itam@itam.mx
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