2015

 

1. Aguilar A., Carranza E., Goldsten M., Kilic T., y Oseni G., "Decomposition of gender differentials in agricultural productivity in Ethiopia."  Agricultural Economics, 46  (2015) 311–334

Abstract:

A number of studies document gender differentials in agricultural productivity. However, they are limited to region and crop-specific estimates of the mean gender gap. This article improves on previous work in three ways. First, data representative at the national level and for a wide variety of crops is exploited. Second, decomposition methods—traditionally used in the analysis of wage gender gaps—are employed. Third, heterogeneous effects by women’s marital status and along the productivity distribution are analyzed. Drawing on data from the 2011–2012 Ethiopian Rural Socioeconomic Survey, we find an overall 23.4 percentage point productivity differential in favor of men, of which 13.5 percentage points (57%) remain unexplained after accounting for gender differences in land manager characteristics, land attributes, and access to resources. The magnitude of the unexplained fraction is large relative to prior estimates in the literature. A more detailed analysis suggests that differences in the returns to extension services, land certification, land extension, and product diversification may contribute to the unexplained fraction. Moreover, the productivity gap is mostly driven by non-married female managers—particularly divorced women—; married female managers do not display a disadvantage. Finally, overall and unexplained gender differentials are more pronounced at mid-levels of productivity.


2. Arrieta-Ibarra, I. y Lobato, I., "Testing for Predictability in Financial Returns Using Statitcal Learning Procedures."   Journal of Time Series Analysis, 36 (2015) 672-686.

Abstract:

This article addresses the stability properties of a simple economy (characterized by a one-dimensional state variable) when the representative agent, confronted by trajectories thatare divergent from the steady state, performs transformations in that variable in order toimprove forecasts. We find that instability continues to be a robust outcome for transfor-mations such as differencing and detrending the data, the two most typical approachesin econometrics to handle nonstationary time series data. We also find that inverting thedata, a transformation that can be motivated by the agent reversing the time direction inan attempt to improve her forecasts, may lead the dynamics to a perfect-foresight path.


3.  Bajraj, G., y Ülkü, L., "Choosing two finalists and the winner."  Social Choice and Welfare, 45 (2015) 729-744.

Abstract:

We study a class of boundedly rational choice functions which operate as follows. The decision maker uses two criteria in two stages to make a choice. First, she shortlists the top two alternatives, i.e. two finalists, according to one criterion. Next, she chooses the winner in this binary shortlist using the second criterion. The criteria are linear orders that rank the alternatives. Only the winner is observable. We study the behavior exhibited by this choice procedure and provide an axiomatic characterization of it. We leave as an open question the characterization of a generalization to larger shortlists.


 4. Chatterji, S. y Lobato, I.,"On divergent dynamics with ordinary least squares learning."   Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 109  (2015) 1-9.

Abstract:

This article addresses the stability properties of a simple economy (characterized by a one-dimensional state variable) when the representative agent, confronted by trajectories thatare divergent from the steady state, performs transformations in that variable in order toimprove forecasts. We find that instability continues to be a robust outcome for transfor-mations such as differencing and detrending the data, the two most typical approachesin econometrics to handle nonstationary time series data. We also find that inverting thedata, a transformation that can be motivated by the agent reversing the time direction inan attempt to improve her forecasts, may lead the dynamics to a perfect-foresight path.


5. Domínguez, M. A. y Lobato I.N. "A simple omnibus over identification specification test for time series econometric models,"  Econometric Theory, 2015, Vol 31 , Issue 04, 891 – 910

Abstract:

Despite their theoretical advantages, Integrated Conditional Moment (ICM) specification tests are not commonly employed in the econometrics practice. An important reason is that the employed test statics are nonpivotal, an so critical values are not readily avaliable. This article proposes an omnibus testin the spirit of the ICM tests of Bierens and Ploberger (1997) where the test static is based on the minimized value of a quadratic function of the residuals of time series econometric models. The proposed test falls under the category of overidentification leads us to propose a straightforward wild bootstrap procedure that requires only linear regressions to estimate the critical values irrespective of the model functional form. Hence, contrary to other existing ICM tests, the critical values are easily calculated while the test preserves the admissibility.


6. Fernández, A., y Meza F., "Informal employment and business cycles in emerging economies: The case of Mexico.Review of Economic Dynamics, 18 (2015) 381-405.

Abstract:

We document how informal employment in Mexico is countercyclical, lags the cycle and is negatively correlated with formal employment. This contributes to explaining why total employment in Mexico displays low cyclicality and variability over the business cycle when compared to Canada, a developed economy with a much smaller share of informal employment. To account for these empirical findings, we build a business cycle model of a small, open economy that incorporates formal and informal labor markets and calibrate it to Mexico. The model performs well in terms of matching conditional and unconditional moments in the data. It also sheds light into the channels through which informal economic activity may affect business cycles. Introducing informal employment into a standard model amplifies the effects of productivity shocks. This is linked to productivity shocks being imperfectly propagated from the formal to the informal sector. It also shows how imperfect measurement of informal economic activity in national accounts can translate into stronger variability in aggregate economic activity.


7. Massó, J., Nicoló, A., Sen., A., Sharma, T., y Ülkü, L., "On Cost Sharing in the Provision of a Binary and Excludable Public Good"  Journal of Economic Theory,155 (2015): 30-49.

Abstract:

We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criteron, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower.


8. Silva, J., y Sadka, J.,  "How Much Is It Worth? Evidence On Back Pay In Unfair Dismissal Cases In Mexico."  Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 36 (2015) 411-422

Abstract:

This Article uses a novel data set gathered from firing disputes filed against the Mexican Ministry of Education during 1988-1997, to analyze how back pay provisions in Mexican labor law were enforced previous to the labor reform in December 2012. We find that a rate of enforcement of these provisions of less than 50%, and we show evidence that collecting significant amounts of back pay is correlated to much longer durations of firing lawsuits. These results suggest that strongly pro-worker provisions in labor laws may tend to be enforced imperfectly, while providing greater incentives for litigation and for lengthier disputes.


9. Payró, F., y Ülkü, L.,  "Similarity-Based Mistakes in Choice",  Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61 (2015) 152-156.

Abstract:

We characterize the following choice procedure. The decision maker is endowed with two binary relations over alternatives, a preference and a similarity. In every choice problem she includes in her choice set all alternatives which are similar to the best feasible alternative. Hence she can, by mistake, choose an inferior option because it is similar to the best. We characterize this boundedly rational behavior by suitably weakening the rationalizability axiom of Arrow (1959). We also characterize a variation where the decision maker chooses alternatives on the basis of their similarities to attractive yet infeasible options. We show that similarity based mistakes of either kind lead to cyclical behavior. Finally, we reinterpret our procedure as a method for choosing a bundle given a set of individual items, in which the decision maker combines the best feasible item with those that complement it.


10. Ajzenman, Nicolas, Sebastian Galiani, Enrique Seira, "On the Distributive Costs of Drug- Related Homicides", The Journal of Law and Economics 58.4 (2015): 779-803

Abstract:

We exploit the manyfold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing.


11. Romans Pancs. "Efficient Dark Markets".Economic Theory, 2015, Vol. 59, Issue 3, 605–624.
 
Abstract:
 
This paper studies a standard dynamic trading environment with asymmet-ric information. A trading mechanism, called a dark market, is proposed that achievesallocative efficiency (i.e., maximizes the total surplus). The mechanism’s critical fea-ture is that it conceals from traders the history of past trades. Under plausible condi-tions, the dark market is stable (i.e., impervious to non-conforming trades offered byan entrant market-maker).