El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "Understanding information acquisition through f-informativity and duality"
Presentado por: Tommaso Denti (NYU)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 28 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag: "Greener on the Other Side: Inequity and Tax Compliance".
Presentado por: evan Kresch (Oberlin)
Se llevará a cabo el 25 de marzo de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala de Seminarios", Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
Governments frequently use proxies for deservingness—tags—to implement progressive tax and transfer policies. These proxies are often imperfect, leading to misclassification and inequities among equally deserving individuals. This paper studies the efficiency effects of such misclassification in the context of the property tax system in Manaus, Brazil. We leverage quasi-experimental variation in inequity generated by the boundaries of geographic sectors used to compute tax liabilities and a large tax reform in a series of augmented boundary discontinuity designs. We find that inequities significantly reduce compliance. The elasticity of compliance with respect to inequity is between 0.12 and 0.25, accounting for half of the observed change in compliance. A simple model of presumptive property taxation shows how mistagging affects the optimal tax schedule, highlighting the opposite implications of responses to the level of taxation and to inequity for optimal tax progressivity. Interpreting our findings through the lens of the model implies that optimal progressivity is around 50% lower than it would be absent inequity responses. These results highlight the importance of inequity for public policy design, especially in contexts with low fiscal capacity.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: “Contracts with Interdependent Preferences”
Presentado por: Marek Weretka (Wisconsin)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 21 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios,Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
A principal contracts with multiple agents, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983). Agents have interdependent preferences, but otherwise the setting is classical. We characterize optimal contracts, and relate the direction of co-movement in rewards — “joint liability” (positive) or “tournaments” (negative) — to the assumed structure of preference interdependence. At the same time, as we range over a symmetric range of positively and negatively interdependent preferences, the corre-
sponding distribution of optimal contracts leans towards commonality in payoffs (e.g., joint liability) rather than differences (e.g., tournaments), in a sense made precise in the
paper. This asymmetry is qualified to some degree when the mechanism-design problem is augmented by robustness constraints designed to eliminate multiple equilibria.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "Religion, Education, and the State*
Presentado por: Benjamin Marx
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 14 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario, presentado por: Archisman Chakroborty (Yeshiva U).
Se llevará a cabo el 7 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "Selected Facts"
Presentado por: Archisman Chakroborty
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 7 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala Isóptica "A", Santa Teresa.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag: “Rolling Back Progresa: School and Work After the End of a Landmark Anti-Poverty Program”
Presentado por: Susan Parker
Se llevará a cabo el 4 de marzo de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala Isóptica A, Santa Teresa
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag presentado por. Susan Parker
Se llevará a cabo el 4 demarzo de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala Isóptica "A", Santa Teresa.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "The National Debt in a Framework of Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy"
Presentado por: Manuel Santos (U. Miami)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 28 de febrero de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala Isóptica "A" de Santa Teresa.
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario presentado por: Casey Petroff (Rochester)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 21 de febrero de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala Isóptica "A" de Santa Teresa.
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