El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: “Contracts with Interdependent Preferences”
Presentado por: Marek Weretka (Wisconsin)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 21 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios,Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
A principal contracts with multiple agents, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983). Agents have interdependent preferences, but otherwise the setting is classical. We characterize optimal contracts, and relate the direction of co-movement in rewards — “joint liability” (positive) or “tournaments” (negative) — to the assumed structure of preference interdependence. At the same time, as we range over a symmetric range of positively and negatively interdependent preferences, the corre-
sponding distribution of optimal contracts leans towards commonality in payoffs (e.g., joint liability) rather than differences (e.g., tournaments), in a sense made precise in the
paper. This asymmetry is qualified to some degree when the mechanism-design problem is augmented by robustness constraints designed to eliminate multiple equilibria.