Seminarios Actuales

21
Mar
12:00

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: “Contracts with Interdependent Preferences”

 

Presentado por: Marek Weretka (Wisconsin)

 

El seminario se llevará a cabo el 21 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios,Santa Teresa.

Abstract:

A principal contracts with multiple agents, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983). Agents have interdependent preferences, but otherwise the setting is classical. We characterize optimal contracts, and relate the direction of co-movement in rewards — “joint liability” (positive) or “tournaments” (negative) — to the assumed structure of preference interdependence. At the same time, as we range over a symmetric range of positively and negatively interdependent preferences, the corre-

sponding distribution of optimal contracts leans towards commonality in payoffs (e.g., joint liability) rather than differences (e.g., tournaments), in a sense made precise in the

paper. This asymmetry is qualified to some degree when the mechanism-design problem is augmented by robustness constraints designed to eliminate multiple equilibria.

 

Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
25
Mar
14:00

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag presentado por: evan Kresch (Oberlin)

Se llevará a cabo el 25 de marzo de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala de Seminarios", Santa Teresa.

Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
28
Mar
12:00

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario presentado por: Tommaso Denti (NYU)

El seminario se llevará a cabo el 28 de marzo de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa.

Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa