Conferencias y seminarios pasados

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag, presentado por: Galip Kemal Ozham (IMF)

Se llevará a cabo el 29 de abril, de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario presentado por: Richard Sweeney (Boston College).

Se llevará a cabo el 25 de abril, de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "Bundling to save: Analyzing package size choices in South African grocery stores". 

Presentado por: Andrea Szabo (U. Houston)

Se llevará a cabo el 4 de abrile de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.

Abstract:

Storable goods such as laundry detergent come in different package sizes with different associated unit prices. Buying larger packages is an opportunity to save, but low-income consumers in African countries often appear to forego this opportunity and buy small packages instead. I investigate the determinants of these choices by estimating a model of dynamic consumer demand using scanner data from all stores of South Africa’s leading grocery chain. The estimation accounts for “bundling:” due to temporary sales and non-linear pricing of the product, consumers sometimes find it less expensive to purchase multiple small packages instead of a large package. The results show that this phenomenon is quantitatively important in explaining observed patterns in the data. Counterfactual simulations use the model’s findings to evaluate the impact of offering different package sizes, which is a relevant consideration for the current expansion of small-format chain stores to low-income areas.

El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag: "Greener on the Other Side: Inequity and Tax Compliance".

Presentado por: evan Kresch (Oberlin)

Se llevará a cabo el 25 de marzo de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala de Seminarios", Santa Teresa.

Abstract:

Governments frequently use proxies for deservingness—tags—to implement progressive tax and transfer policies. These proxies are often imperfect, leading to misclassification and inequities among equally deserving individuals. This paper studies the efficiency effects of such misclassification in the context of the property tax system in Manaus, Brazil. We leverage quasi-experimental variation in inequity generated by the boundaries of geographic sectors used to compute tax liabilities and a large tax reform in a series of augmented boundary discontinuity designs. We find that inequities significantly reduce compliance. The elasticity of compliance with respect to inequity is between 0.12 and 0.25, accounting for half of the observed change in compliance. A simple model of presumptive property taxation shows how mistagging affects the optimal tax schedule, highlighting the opposite implications of responses to the level of taxation and to inequity for optimal tax progressivity. Interpreting our findings through the lens of the model implies that optimal progressivity is around 50% lower than it would be absent inequity responses. These results highlight the importance of inequity for public policy design, especially in contexts with low fiscal capacity.