El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario presentado por: Glen Weyl.
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 1 de diciembre de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Conferencias y seminarios pasados
28
Nov
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: “Tax Evasion and Worker Exploitation: Evidence from a Domestic Outsourcing Prohibition in Mexico”.
Presentado por: Alejandro Estefan (Notre Dame).
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 28 de noviembre de 14:00 a 15:00 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
24
Nov
12:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: Sex, Power, and Adolescence: Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Behaviors".
Presentado por: Manisha Shah.
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 24 de noviembre de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
Adolescents in Sub-Saharan Africa have some of the highest rates of intimate partner violence across the globe. This paper evaluates the impact of a randomized controlled trial that offers females a goal setting activity to improve their sexual and reproductive health outcomes and offers their male partners a soccer intervention, which educates and inspires young men to make better sexual and reproductive health choices. Both interventions reduce female reports of intimate partner violence. Impacts are larger among females who were already sexually active at baseline. We develop a model to understand the mechanisms at play. The soccer intervention improves male attitudes around violence and risky sexual behaviors. Females in the goal setting arm take more control of their sexual and reproductive health by exiting violent relationships. Both of these mechanisms drive reductions in IPV.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
21
Nov
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: “The Returns to Face-to-Face Interactions: Knowledge Spillovers in Silicon Valley” with Keith Chen and Anton Popov”.
Presentado por: David Atkin (MIT)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 21 de noviembre de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
14
Nov
14:00
En Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al Brown Bag presentado por el Dr. Shaun McRae.
Se llevará a cabo el 14 de noviembre de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la sala de seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
31
Oct
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: " A Model of Expenditure Shocks"
Presentado por: Daniel Murphy (Darden, UVA).
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 31 de octubre de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
We introduce a new quantitative model of household expenditure shocks to rationalize the common anecdote of a low-income and low-liquidity household that uses additional income to save (repay debt) rather than consume. Our model also rationalizes key features of the joint dynamics of household-level consumption and income, including our finding that consumption is volatile yet disconnected from income. The key feature of our model is stochastic consumption thresholds that yield large utility costs if violated. The stochastic thresholds increase the welfare cost of income fluctuations by an order of magnitude.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
30
Oct
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE); te invita al seminario: “Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection”
Presentado por: Lucia del Carpio (INSEAD)
El Seminario se llevará a cabo el lunes 30 de octubre, de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa
Abstract:
Tax collection by capacity constrained governments may exhibit multiple equilibria: if delinquency is low, limited enforcement capacity is enough to discipline deviators; if delinquency is high, limited enforcement capacity is overstretched and no longer dissuasive. In principle, divide-and-conquer, a theoretically important but untested principle
from mechanism design, can be used to unravel the undesirable high-delinquency equilibrium. We investigate the challenge of doing so in practice.
Our preferred mechanism takes the form of Prioritized Iterative Enforcement (PIE). Tax-payers are assigned a rank trading-off expected collection and expected capacity
use. Tax-payers are then iteratively threatened in small groups for which collection capacity is sufficient to induce compliance. After repayment occurs, unused collection
capacity is released to issue the next round of threats.
In partnership with a district of Lima (Peru) we experimentally evaluate the impact of PIE on the collection of property taxes from 13432 tax-payers. Reduced-form evidence both validates and refines the theoretical benchmark. A structural model of tax-payer behavior suggests that, keeping the number of collection actions fixed, PIE would increase tax revenue by 11.3%.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
27
Oct
12:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "State Capacity as an Organizational Problem. Evidence from the Growth of the U.S. State Over 100 Years"
Presentado por: Edoardo Teso (Northwestern University)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 27 de octubre de 12:00 a 13:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Abstract:
We study how the organization of the state evolves over the process of development of a nation, using a new dataset on the internal organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over 1817-1905. First, we show a series of facts, describing how the size of the state, its presence across the territory, and its key organizational features evolved over the nineteenth century.
Second, exploiting the staggered expansion of the railroad and telegraph networks across space, we show that the ability of politicians to monitor state agents throughout the territory is an
important driver of these facts: locations with lower transportation and communication costs with Washington DC have more state presence, are delegated more decision power, and have
lower employee turnover. The results suggest that high monitoring costs are associated with small, personalistic state organizations based on networks of trust; technological shocks lowering monitoring costs facilitate the emergence of modern bureaucratic states.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
25
Oct
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario.
Impartido por: Raissa Fabregas (UT Austin)
El seminario se llevará a cabo el miércoles 25 de octubre de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
24
Oct
14:00
El Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), te invita al seminario: "Escaping the Losses from Trade: The Impact of Heterogeneity and Skill Acquisition"
Presentado por: Ricardo Reyes Heroles.
El seminario se llevará a cabo el 24 de octubre de 14:00 a 15:30 horas en la Sala de Seminarios de Santa Teresa.
Sala de Seminarios, Santa Teresa
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